Stream and Physical

A discussion on recent attacks, where we are as industry, what mistakes we are seeing time and time again within the industry and how we may wish to address them so we can progress more effectively.

A discussion on the parameters of the EO, the impacts on operational technology, what end users can expect and current thinking on what it does and not cover for us! 

Meet all of our sponsors in the physical exhibitor room for demonstrations, coffee and snacks. 

Hear live demonstrations on our virtual platform!
Industrial Defender: 11am live demo

Targeted ransomware has emerged as a major threat to industrial operations / OT systems. The Colonial Pipeline and JBS shutdowns are only the latest incident - in 2020, 53 industrial sites were shut down by targeted ransomware. The trend is likely to worsen - today's targeted attacks use tools and techniques comparable to those used exclusively by nation states only a half decade ago. 

Operational Technology (OT) cyber risk manages cyber threats to physical operations. Some enterprise security mechanisms are very costly to apply in OT systems because of extended safety, equipment protection and other OT risk management programs. We see emergency risk avoidance mechanisms which are unique to the OT space, but are under-utilized by enterprise risk management and security practitioners. 

This presentation highlights three such innovative cyber risk management approaches and examines their effectiveness against the pervasive threat of targeted ransomware with particular attention on the operations risk. The presentation will outline a simple and robust approach to managing OT cyber risks, including Security PHA Review (SPR), Consequence-Driven, Cyber-Informed Engineering (CCE), and Secure Operations Technology (SEC-OT). Secure sites in the industry are improving protection for their operations by cherry-picking techniques from these new methodologies. Join us for a whirlwind tour of trends in OT and industrial operations attacks and defenses.

The topic of software bill of materials (SBoM) to provide transparency into software supply chain risks and vulnerabilities for critical infrastructure is gaining momentum through such efforts as the Cybersecurity Executive Order 14028 and the EEI Model Procurement Contract Language. Additionally demand for suppliers to provide insights into their hardware supply chains and foreign adversarial risks is also producing the need for compliance with NDAA Section 889. These requests for transparency have raised many questions about how to meet requirements and do so in a secure fashion.

Join Fortress Information Security to learn how a Cyber Bill of Materials can support supply chain risk management for asset owners and suppliers alike.

Presentation Highlights and Take-Aways:

·  An overview of recent cyber-attacks and the supply chain threat landscape for ICS

·  Breakdown of supply chain security regulations: Section 889 A & B, NERC-CIP regulations and Executive Order 14028

·  The Importance of both Software (SBOM) and Hardware Bill of Materials (HBOM) & 4th Party Evaluations

·  Identifying and mitigating supplier concerns for adoption – Cutting through the Fear, Uncertainty and Doubt

·  Continuous Monitoring, Attestation sharing and use of Blockchain as a force multiplier to secure the industry

·  BOM supplier and purchaser coordination for success

Thanks first to the Solarwinds attack and then Executive Order 14028 -  Improving the Nation’s Cybersecurity, the security of the software supply chain has become the hot topic of the year. The Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack made critical infrastructure security front page news. This talk will look at the intersection of these two challenges - why securing the supply chain for critical OT environments is now an urgent priority for asset owners, suppliers and government agencies. In this session you will learn:

• Why supply chain and ransomware attacks are dramatically increasing 
• The new obligations set out in EO14028 that industry will need to follow
• How EO14028 requirements will ripple far beyond government contracts
• How Software Bill of Materials (SBOMs) will help secure software supply chains
• What asset owners should be demanding from their OEM Vendors to secure OT systems
• Why AI will be crucial for locating and prioritizing product vulnerabilities

There is a large effort to quickly bring SBOM to the OT industry. Then what? I get impact analysis will in part be faster. But what about provenance? What happens if a US company discovers there is a SW component from China? Or the Chinese discover the component they  thought was from Hong Kong is actually from Japan? The geopolitical implications can be significant. How is the drive towards regionalism and away from globalism going to affect our industry?

How do SBOMS currently work (examples)- What are they? Who is currently utilizing them?
How can asset owners use SBOM?

Additional dialogue if time allows:
Are they secure? Is the code being updated upstream?
Who is going to maintain SBOMs?
Who at the facility (asset owner/end user) is responsible for maintaining and monitoring the SBOM?

A deeper discussion into cybersecurity for a post operational world, dismantlement, inventory tracking and management and the challenges for operational decommissioning.

There are plethora of incredible cyber risk reducing innovative solutions being brought to market.  This discussion will highlight the milestones required for an OT system owner and vendor to overcome in order to bring significant risk reducing solutions from innovation, to market, to implementation.  Operational Technology Software Defined Networking (OT SDN) will be the backdrop to this story line between UK NG and SEL.   

Topics to be discussed in order for innovation to be implemented:

• Innovation requires acceptance into standards and frameworks 
• Standard and frameworks require acceptance into regulation
• Regulation is important for acquisition and to become added to specification and designs
• Timing and funding become involved to put innovation into new or legacy projects
• Innovation acceptance additionally involves training, education, experience, and cultural change  
• Any innovation also requires careful consideration to not increase operational risk

All of the above compete with adversaries who use the time it take to move from innovation to implementation to find gaps and seams and weaknesses in these system before they are even deployed. This presentation will address ways to reduce the time between milestones to implement innovation faster and safer to ultimately reduce risk?

Sponsored by Trend Micro

Welcome Back

• OT monitoring
• Segmentation
• SOC integration
• Standards
• Digital Immunity
• 3rd Party Risk
• Remote Access

Technology Maturity - what impacts does this have on the implementation?
How much disruption when integrating into existing processes should be expected and how can we keep that to a minimum?
How can we view "innovation" as a journey rather than a destination-is the environment adaptable? How can it be made adaptable? Are the "innovations" scalable so we are not always starting from scratch? 
How do we keep risk to a minimum? What does the process of execution look like?
Is speed of the implementation prioritised and what impacts does it have

• Vanishing divide between IT and OT
• What is the voice of the customer?
• Dealing with the hype and understanding the threats
• Integration of technologies and partnerships
• Beyond OT Cybersecurity to Asset Performance Management

Apologies to all, despite all our efforts we were unable to replace this session drop out. We will be announcing an exciting addition, stay tuned!

In this era of converged Building Control Systems, the HVAC, Lighting, Fire, Parking, Elevators, Digital Signage have now become attack surfaces that can be used to compromise not just the building systems, but also the tenants and visitors of the building and their organizational IT systems. In this session we will explore some of the best practices for adopting Zero Trust architectures, use of Cloud services, SOC-as-a-Service, and Contingency Planning/Disaster Recovery for when a cyber incident does occur. Buildings are exceptionally difficult to protect as they are used in every sector but can have different ownership types (REITS, government, private sector), levels of physical security (contract guard, secure facility, Defense Industrial Base, etc.), different levels of energy security (stand-by power, prime power, Distributed Energy Resources), different levels of recovery/resiliency (medical, data centers, commercial office space, residential, etc.) and different financial business models (Triple Net Lease, Energy Savings Performance Contracts, LEED, EPA Energy Star, etc.). The session will look at the proliferation of attack surfaces address, examine the cost savings versus the potential impacts, how to balance risk to succeed -what does that risk management strategy look like? The building owners ultimately need to decide if they are sacrificing security for efficiency and the role their building will play in their portfolio for the next decades.

A presentation on the US DoD’s priorities, major efforts and way forward.  

How are we:
Cybersecurity needs to lead the business case
Getting data out of OT?
Using data coming out of OT?
How can we protect it once we have it?
Is it accessible?
How are we using the data?
How can we separate actionable intelligence from white noise?
What is the business case, why are we gathering it?

·       How the vision developed and why we felt this journey was necessary 

·       Identifying gaps in current plans and understanding the stakeholders in planning 

·       Breaking down silo's between departments - A look at the challenges, how do we bring the vision to fruition?

·       Collaboration between IT and Operations Maturing of our efforts and their impacts (enhanced security, cultural shift in taking ownership of cyber/operational interconnectivity)

·       What we see in the future

Further panellists to be announced.

OEMs are taking a more active approach to product security and development, Patching is one of the oldest and most traditional ways to manage risk. It also is a slow and expensive way to manage risk so it is frequently avoided in the OT world. What else should be considered to manage risk?